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DEATH WITH DIGNITY
AND THE "LIVING WILL":
A COMMENTARY ON
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Dennis J. Horan*
and Thomas J. Marzen

**

By 1977, eight states had enacted legislation to assure "natural death,"
"death with dignity" or the "right to die." At least 59 other bills are pending
in 42 states which purport to advance the same interests. 1
The statutes so far enacted in California, Arkansas, North Carolina, New
Mexico, Texas, Nevada, Idaho and Oregon 2 do not allow "mercy killing"; they
specifically forbid it, thus reflecting a social consensus in opposition to any
public policy that might, even by inference, demean the value of all born
human life, even if senile or infirm. Generally, these statutes provide that the
terminally ill patient may execute a legally enforceable directive or "will"
which prohibits the physician from initiating or continuing heroic or extraordinary treatment under certain circumstances.
The laws of Texas, Idaho and Oregon are substantially similar to California's
Natural Death Act, the first legislative incursion into this heretofore private
area. The Nevada law is similar to California's in most respects, though the
terms and definitions are not the same. New Mexico's law is modeled closely
after the draft legislation promoted by the Society for the Right to Die, 3 a
social action unit of the Euthanasia Foundation, with a few provisions borrowed
from the California statute and the addition of a provision for the termination
of heroic treatment for minors. It is the only state law in this area based
directly on the euthanasia group's model law. North Carolina, unlike the other
states, has included a definition of brain death. The Arkansas statute is the
briefest, least complex and most radical, providing for the execution of a
directive by one person on behalf of another and with no time limit upon the
legal force of the executed directive.
The extent to which such "right to die" legislation in fact serves its
purported purpose-"a dignified" or "natural" death-is open to serious
question.
*Member of the Illinois Bar. Partner - Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller. Lecturer in
Law, University of Chicago Law School. Chairman, Right to Live/Right to Die Subcommittee and Vice
Chairman, General Committee on Medicine and Law, American Bar Association Section of Insurance,
Negligence and Compensation Law. Co-editor and co-author, Death, Dying and Euthanasia (University
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1. Euthanasia: 1977 Legislative Review (National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1977).
2. .Ark. Stat. Ann. §§82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1977); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§7185-7195 (West
Supp. 1977); Idaho Code §§39-4501 to -4508 (Supp. 1977); N.C. Gen Stat. §§90-320 to -322 (Supp.
1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§449.540 - .690 (1977); Tex. Health Code Ann. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp.
1977);- An Act Relating to Medical Treatment of Terminally Ill Patients, 33rd Leg., 1st Sess., ch.
287, 1977 N.M. Laws.
3. Society for the Right to Die, Draft State Natural Death Act (250 W. 57 St., New York, NY 10019).

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 5: 81

The thesis of this article is that such legislation as currently exists in this
sensitive area is counterproductive, confusing and inhibitory-that it obscures
rather than solves the problem of a humane and dignified death.
A competent adult may refuse medical treatment unless countervailing4
interests of other persons or the state would be jeopardized by this refusal.
This general principle flows from the common law. rule, which requires
no statutory recognition, that any unconsented touching is a battery. The
Quinlan5 and Saikewicz 6 cases have added a constitutional dimension by finding
within the constitutional right of privacy a right to refuse medical treatment.
The rare exceptions to this general principle occur only when courts find
sufficient public interest at stake to order 'compulsory treatment. This
court-mandated medical treatment takes place when public health might be
adversely affected, 7 when children become abandoned wards of the state, 8 or
when a woman is pregnant. 9 .
A patient may reject medical treatment as a matter of choice, and this
choice can be respected by the attending physician, without any state "living
will" statute. Thus, for the adult who remains competent through terminal
illness, and for his physician, "living will" legislation is legally superfluous.
Such legislation. ostensibly provides an opportunity for a written and
enforceable expression of patient choice should the person become incompetent
during terminal illness. To justify living will legislation upon this ground alone,
however, presumes that the physician would be liable for failure to extend
heroic treatment in the absence of a specific refusal by the patient. But short
of abandonment, the physician is under no obligation to initiate or continue
extraordinary means of life support. Indeed, it is customary for physicians,,
with familial consent, to discontinue or fail to initiate such treatment without
violating the ethical norms of the community or their profession; there is as
yet no reported case, civil or criminal, in which liability has been attached
for discontinuance of treatment for the terminally ill.10
An opportunity to provide for a written directive of refusal of heroic
treatment might be desirable, it is said, to supply the physician with knowledge
of the patient's preference of which he might not otherwise be aware. In
addition, it can be argued that such legislation may relieve the family of an
otherwise difficult decision. These "living will" statutes, however, provide no
new substantive rights for the patient or immunities for the physician. What
they do supply is a procedure for implementation' of patient choice and, in
some instances, penalties for the physician who fails to abide by it. If "living
will" legislation has value to the extent it clarifies patient choice, or educates
the terminally ill patient about his rights and- interests, or relieves the family
and physician from decision-making, that value must ultimately be balanced
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Robert M. Byrne, Compulsory Life Saving Treatment for the Competent Adult, 44 Fordham L. Rev.
1 (1975). Such a decision cannot probe properly be construed to be euthanasia. See Germain Grisez,
"Suicide and Euthanasia," in Death, Dying and Euthanasia 742 (1977).
In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). See also Dennis J. Horan, "The Quinlan Case,"
in Death, Dying and Euthanasia 525 (1977).
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, - Mass. -, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964),cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
Note, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 Notre Dame Law.
12.02 (1973).
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against possible confusions, opportunities for excess, and impediments to humane
treatment of the dying created by the statutes themselves.
"Living will" legislation obscures the question of a patient's right to decline
extraordinary means of medical 'treatment. It increases rather than decreases
the decisional burden upon the physician. In addition, the statutes do not
clarify the area of greatest need-those patients who reach the terminal stage
while comatose or incompetent and who have never executed a living will. If
current statistics concerning the number of people who die'without wills are
relevant, then we must realize that the area of greatest need is for a better
understanding of the law by the patient and his physician. Most people will
reach the terminal stage without a living will. It is for these patients and
their physicians that current legislation creates problems.
THE MINOR AND INCOMPETENT
Only the Arkansas and New Mexico statutes deal with the area of presumed
legal confusion which provided media attention and much of the impetus for
such legislation in the first place: the problem of the incompetent adult or
the minor as in the litigation involving 'Karen Ann Quinlan.
Section 3 of the Arkansas act provides for the issuance of a directive to
terminate treatment for an incompetent adult who had not issued his own
directive, or for a minor by a third party in a manner closely analogous to
testimentary disposition of property and according to identical formalities. The
highest priority lies in the spouse or parent of a minor. If the spouse is
unwilling or unable to act, his "child" 18 years or older may then issue the
directive. If there is more than one child over 18, however, the majority of
the children determine whether treatment shall continue. Whether death shall
be "dignified" or not may thus be determined by the casting of ballots upon
the failing body of the family progenitor. No mention is made of procedures
in the event of a tie vote. Unaccountably, the Arkansas statute makes no
provision for evaluation of the possible unwritten preferences of the patient,
much less examination of the possible ill will on the part of his relatives, or
whether his best interests are at stake in the relatives' decision. Since one
supposes that "right to die" legislation is primarily intended to preserve
patientperogatives, these are indeed strange and abusive ommissions.
New Mexico provides that parents or family may consent to refuse to
initiate or continue extraordinary means through execution of a directive.1 1 The
family decision is apparently not open to judicial review as the Saikewicz12
case holds, or to inspection of a medical ethics board as in the Quinlan 13 case.
Normally, whether the physician obtains the consent of the family or kin is
a separate problem from termination of heroic treatment. The former is an
exercise of business judgment-action to avoid suit; the latter is an exercise
in sound medical judgment-determining that continued treatment is useless.
As a matter of prudence the physician should obtain consent of the family to
terminate a form of treatment which will be followed by death, if only to
preclude maintenance of an action by all who consented. Permission of the
family has not, however, been a legal prerequisite' to a medical decision to
11.
12.
13.

An Act Relating to Medical Treatment of Terminally Patients, 33rd Leg., 1st Sess., ch. 287, 1977
N.M. Laws, §4.
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, supra note 6.
In Re Quinlan, supra note 5.
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refuse to initiate or continue treatment that prolongs death. Because of
unwillingness of the family to confront such decisions, this provision might
defeat its intent.
In states other than New Mexico and Arkansas which have passed such
legislation, no provision is made for refusal or discontinuance of treatment for
minors. Minors, of course, cannot execute a will, "living" or otherwise. In
states other than Arkansas, an incompetent adult is dealt with only insofar as
he satisfies the provisions of the statutes prior to a determination of incompetence.
INFORMED AND VOLUNTARY CONSENT
The statutes employ a variety of officious requirements designed to assure
the competent, voluntary and informed consent of the patient at the time the
directive is executed. Competent and voluntary consent is, of course, the major
question in determining the validity of any will. Unfortunately, however, these
statutes merely tend to compound confusion in an already difficult area of
law.
For example, Sections 7186 and 7188 of California's Natural Death
Act 14 appear to condition the directive upon the voluntary consent given when
a patient is of "sound mind." But Section 7191(b) establishes a conclusive
presumption that the will is valid if a "qualified patient" executed it within
14 days or more after the patient is advised that he or she has a terminal
illness. A "qualified patient" in accord with Section 7187(e) is one found to
be terminally ill, competent or not. Section 7191(b) determines that the
physician is guilty of "unprofessional conduct" if he does not abide by the
will, or refer the patient to another physician who will discontinue life-sustaining
procedures. Section 7190 provides for physician immunity from any criminal
or civil liability for discontinuance of treatment only if he complies with the
act.
Thus, on the face of the statute, evidence of unsound mind at the time
of execution cannot rebut the conclusive presumption of validity, even though
there might be good reason to suppose that judgment might be impaired simply
because a directive to which a conclusive presumption is attached must be
executed by a patient recently informed of terminal illness. One presumes that
the entire will-conclusive presumption and all-is without force where the
patient is without "sound mind" at its execution. But how will the attending
physician know whether the patient was competent? Should or must he conduct
an investigation? Since the directive might operate under a conclusive presumption
for as long as five years, how is an investigation even feasible in most situations?
As Professor Yale Kamisar of the University of Michigan Law School has
pointed out, 15 even reasonable assurance of informed and voluntary consent in
this area meets almost insurmountable difficulties. The statutes so far enacted
confront the problem of consent either clumsily or not at all; apparently content
with gross declarations of principle and sentimental evocations of an ideal
death. Where exceptions are made in view of circumstances where the directive
might not fully represent informed consent, they tend to defeat entirely the
original intent of the statute.
14.
15.

Cal. Health & Safety Code §§7186, 7188 (West Supp. 1977).
Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 969 (1958).
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For example, Section 7191(c) of the California act provides that when a
patient becomes "qualified" after he has executed the will, the physician is
to give "weight" to the directive. He may also consider other factors, such as
preferences of family and even the "totality of circumstances." For the probable
majority of persons who execute the directive-those who do not execute or
re-execute after notification of terminal illness or injury-the will thus becomes
a mere piece of paper with little or no legal significance. The patient might
have accomplished as much through a handwritten letter or even oral instruction
to physician or family, which would probably mean a great deal more to them
than would a formal directive.
THE PHYSICIAN'S ROLE
Ironically, though such legislation is intended to relieve physicians from
decision-making responsibilities in relation to heroic treatment, it accomplishes
the opposite. All the enacted legislation ostensibly provides immunity for the
physician for discontinuance or failure to initiate heroic treatment, despite the
fact that civil or criminal liability has never been attached in any case. But
in so doing, it is implied that there is liability in absence of a directive or
when the directive is invalid. Further, instead of making a medical decision
based upon whether treatment would be heroic or useless, and conferring with
the patient and family as to whether it should be pursued anyway, the physician
is to become embroiled in issues outside his competence and in endlessly
frustrating procedural controversies.
Whether treatment is extraordinary and the patient is terminally ill are
decisions which still must be made. But in California, for example, the
responsible physician confronted with a directive would also be concerned with
whether the patient was of sound mind when the will was executed, whether
the will had been revoked at any time, and whether the patient was "qualified"
at the time of execution. He would confer with his private attorney to solicit
an opinion about immunity, the hospital attorneys to discover whether they
disagreed (or vice-versa), and then offer the issue to the hospital ethics
committee to determine whether they agreed with the lawyers. Then, if it is
decided the patient was "qualified," the physician must weigh the will together
with the "totality of circumstances" surrounding execution so that he might
"justify executing the directive." In accord with Section 7191(a), the physician
would then determine whether the directive complies with the law, whether
the patient is competent, and whether the action contemplated is in "accord
with the desires" of the patient before action is taken. In other words, if the
patient is presently competent, the doctor is to disregard the document and
obtain the customary consent to termination of treatment.
To further illustrate the burden placed -upon the physician, consider that
Section 7191(a) of the California act states that, prior to withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient, the physician
must determine whether the directive complies with Section 7188. Section 7188
determines the correct form for execution of the directive and requires that
it be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related by
blood or marriage and who would not be -entitled to any portion of the estate
under any will or codicil of the declarant or, at the time of the issuance of
the directive, by operation of law. Why not simply convene probate court?
How can the physician possibly know such things? Presumably Section 7191(a)
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applies to the patient who is competent (whereupon the physician must obtain
present informed consent in any case) or where witnesses are available to
comment upon their relationship or status under the patient's will. But why
should the physician become involved in such matters when his task is surely
to attend to the care of a dying human being? In what sense is the dignified
natural death thereby assured? The safeguard procedures are potentially so
complex that the physician is likely to either disregard the will where the
patient was qualified upon execution, or mechanically comply in all circumstances
upon the presumption that the will is always legally binding.
Such legislation is likely to inhibit the physician's effort to treat the dying
patient with dignity, grace and a measure of humanity in yet another way.
Whenever a statute is enacted regulating -conduct, especially where punitive
sanctions are available for non-compliance, the effect is to chill and inhibit
similar conduct otherwise legal but not now in conformity with the requirements
of the act. Thus, physicians may be reluctant to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment unless a directive has been executed by the patient, even
though there is no legal obligation to extend heroic or useless care. If even
20% of the population executed a living will within the requirements of the
given statute-an optimistic figure in view of the small percentage who execute
testaments for disposition of property-the remaining 80% must suffer the
consequences. California attempted to mitigate this problem through !Section
7193 -which indicates that its Natural Death Act does not impair or supercede
any prior right or responsibility the person possesses to effect the lawful
withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. The most deleterious impact of such
legislation-and one of the reasons why it is often opposed by medical
societies-is that it tends to subtract an important area of medical practice
from the usual legal principles by which physician conduct is controlled. In
recent litigation to terminate heroic treatment-in the Quinlan, 16 Dockery 17 and
Saikewicz18 cases-the reason offered by the courts for intrusion into the
physician-patient relationship was fear by the physicians and hospitals of
potential malpractice suit or criminal prosecution. 19 But far from relieving the
physician from fear of liability in this regard, such legislation for the first
time not only implies that the physician may be subject to civil or criminal
prosecution for withdrawal or failure to initiate treatment that prolongs death,
it provides penalties where the physician fails mechanically to comply with a
directive.
Rather than permitting standards of medical practice to develop in this
area in the traditional manner, such legislation attempts the impossible task
of particularizing medical decision-making. A better, more flexible and ultimately
more humane approach would be to permit the determination of customary
standards to remain in the hands of the medical profession. Only if physicians
overstep the bounds of legal or ethical propriety should society intervene.
16.
17.

18.
19.

In Re Quinlan, supra note 5.
Dockery, et al. v. Dockery, No. 51439, Chancery Court, part 2 for Hamilton County, TN. In July,
1977, the Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Tennessee declined to rule on the merits, on
the ground that the issue was not of substantial public interest since Mrs. Dockery had died pending
appeal.
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, supra note 6.
This is so though the physicians testified to the contrary, and in spite of the fact that withdrawal of
extraordinary treament is generally in accord with standard medical practice. It is important to point
out, again, that no civil or criminal cases have arisen on account of withdrawal where the patient is
terminally ill.
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TIMELINESS

Along with the regulation of voluntary and informed consent, and the
burden placed upon the physician, the third important element in such legislation
is the schedule upon which the directive becomes effective. Time and qualification
limitations upon operation of the statute insulate the patient from decisions
which are not relevant to present state of mind or physical condition. They
tend to prevent the effect of a directive from being purely automatic or from
being amended in practice to foster mercy killing.
-The California act provides that the patient's "living will" directive shall
have legal force only if the patient is terminally ill, defined as a "condition
caused by injury, disease or illness" to which "application of life-sustaining
procedures . . . serve only: to postpone the moment of death of the
patient."' 20 It further provides that the directive shall be effective for only five
years. 2 1 Such carefully restrictive qualifications should be compared to Arkansas'
statute, which provides merely that the person shall have the right by directive
to refuse any "artificial, extraordinary, extreme or radical" treatment calculated
to prolong life with no time limit upon the directive's force. 2 2 Such loose
treatment of an important
decision simply invites self-serving definitions of
"artificial" treatment, 23 and contempt for the concept of consent, since such
general permission cannot reasonably be conceived to anticipate the particular
options available in the context of particular disease or injury over the lifetime
of a declarant.
With the exception of Arkansas, the qualification restrictions are generally
defined as restrictively as in the California act: the directive becomes effective
(in the sense it may be put to actual use) only upon terminal illness and only
when the use of extraordinary means of medical care would prolong death.
This latter qualification is a reasonable time, if time there must be, for living
will statutes to become effective.
CONCLUSION
"Living will" legislation presents the attending physician with a welter of
procedural guidelines, thresholds, timetables and qualifications before he or
she may terminate extraordinary or useless care for a dying patient and be
granted the immunity such statutes grant. It does not guarantee that the choice
of the patient will be followed, but merely shifts the grounds upon which the
decision of the attending physician must be made. As a result of the penalties
provided, and as the majority of patients will not execute the directives, these
state laws might inhibit withdrawal of extraordinary means in many instances
where treatment would serve little purpose but to prolong death, discomfort
and pain. Perhaps worse, the presentation of an officious document to a

20. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§1187(c), 1187(f) (West Supp. 1977).
21. Cal. Health & Safety Code §7189.5 (West Supp. 1977).
22. An Act to Permit an Individual to Request or Refuse in Writing Medical or Surgical Means or
Procedures Calculated to Prolong His Life; and to Authorize Such Request or Refusal by Others on
Behalf of One Incompetent or Under 18; and for Other Purposes, H. 826, 1977 Ark. Laws, act 879,
§1; Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-3801 (Supp. 1977).
23. The nature and definition of extraordinary treatment may radically change over the lifetime of a
declarant.
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physician with neither the time nor inclination to investigate the circumstances
of execution, when coupled with penalties for non-compliance, could result in
mechanical implementation without regard to delicate personal and medical
options confronted in particular situations. In practice, the latter circumstance
presents sufficient opportunities to amend such legislation as to constitute forms
of mercy killing, which is all the more insidious because intent is shrouded
by a web of supposed procedural safeguards and formalities.
Death is not ennobled by merely transferring decisions which encompass
it to printed paper in a form determined by the state so the person might be
dispatched in the manner of a used auto. It is apparently imagined that such
legislation represents new maturity-heroic confrontation with the mysteries of
death which, in the past, we have supposedly shunned in fear and anxiety or
shrouded in euphemism, legend and symbol. In fact, it simply adds a layer
of burdensome procedure and legal fiction to the medical gadgetry and jargon
which perhaps too often now attend the end of life.

